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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 13903
DALE S. PIERRE/
Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State of
Utah against Dale S. Pierre, Defendant-Appellant, charging him
with three counts of murder in the first degree in violation of
Section 76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated (1953) , and two counts of
aggravated robbery in violation of Section 76-6-302, Utah Code
Annotated (1973 Supp.).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of three
counts of first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated robbery in the District Court of the Second Judicial District in
and for Davis County, Utah, on November 15, 1974. The jury
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recommended after a hearing that the Defendant be sentenced to
death on all three counts of first-degree murder on November 20,
1974.

On Noyember 27, 1974, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist

sentenced the Defendant to death by shooting on all three counts
of first-degree murder and further sentenced the defendant to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years to life imprisonment in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant-Appellant seeks an order of this Court
reversing the judgment rendered at trial and hearing on the
sentence of this cause, and a ruling remanding the cause to the
trial court for a new trial, or in the alternative, an order
setting aside the sentence of death and remanding the case to
the trial court for the imposition of the sentence of life
imprisonment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amicus stipulates to the facts as stated in the brief
of Respondent in this appeal, which clearly and graphically
depict the Defendant's brutal, savage, and senseless slaughter
of three human beings after subjecting them, and two others, to
an agonizing torture.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT MUST CONSIDER PUBLIC STANDARDS OF DECENCY
IN DECIDING UPON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE PUBLIC
UNQUESTIONABLY FAVORS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.
Both the United States Constitution and the Consti-

tution of the State of Utah prohibit the infliction of "cruel
and unusual punishments" (U. S. Constitution, Amendment 8;
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 9 ) .
In Weems v. U. S,, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the United
States Supreme Court rejected a static interpretation of this
"cruel and unusual" language when it recognized that "time . . .
brings into existence new conditions and purposes," and the
interpretation of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment may change as "public opinion becomes enlightened by a
human justice" (217 U.S. at 378). Later, in Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958), the U. S. Supreme Court reaffirmed this
position when it asserted that the Eighth Amendment derived
its meaning from the "evolving standards of decency that mark
progress of a maturing society" (356 U.S. at 101).
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), six
Justices accepted the proposition that the definition of what
is cruel and unusual punishment changes in accordance with
public opinion prevalent at that time (408 U.S. at 242 [Douglas,
J., concurring]; Id. at 264 [Brennan, J., concurring]; Id.
at 329 [Marshall, J., concurring]; Id. at 382-3 [Burger, C.
J., dissenting]; Id. at 409 [Blackmun, J., dissenting]; Id.
at 429-30 [Powell, J., dissenting].

These Justices expressed
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sharp disagreement, however, on the questions of where the
public stands on the issue of capital punishment, whether
opinion polls are valid indicators of public sentiment about
capital punishment, and the extent to which enlightened public
opinion determines contemporary standards of decency.
Public opinion polls are universally accepted as an
accurate indicator of the public sentiment in most, but not all,
cases.

This is clearly shown in this presidential election

year by comparing - the actual returns with the projected voter
response based on a public opinion poll.

But even in the con-

stantly changing world of presidential politics, the polls
are seldom wrong; and even when they are wrong as to who the
winner will be, they are not far wrong.

Public opinion polls,

although not infallible, are a proper starting point for determining how the public feels on the issue of capital punishment.
The very nature of capital punishment forces legal
scholars to consider things well outside the realm of legal
theory and legal precedents.

As previously noted, judges have

long attempted to decide such issues on the basis of the
nation's "standards of decency."

So, with the assumption that

public opinion polls are, at the very least, a helpful starting point in measuring public sentiment, we will discuss the
results of some recent polls.
Studies have been made on the results of all of the
public opinion polls done in this century.

(See "Public Opinion

and the Death Penalty," Vidmar and Ellsworth, 26 Stanford Law
Review 1245,.1275 [June, 1974].)

According to these studies,
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public support for the death penalty declined at a fairly consistent rate until 1966.

Gallup polls indicated that 62 percent

of the people were in favor of capital punishment in 1936 but
that this number had declined to 42 percent by 1966.
After 1966, however, this trend has reversed; and by
1969, 51 percent of the American public supported the death
penalty.

Nationwide polls conducted subsequent to 1969 show

that this upward trend has continued.

In 1973, 57 percent

favored capital punishment (Gallup Opinion Index, March, 1973).
The most recent poll taken indicated that a strong
64 percent of the nation now favors capital punishment.

It is

interesting to note that no area of the country fell below 63
percent in favoring the death penalty.

Further, every cate-

gory of persons--sex, race, income, religion, political affiliation, occupation, and population, both urban and rural-<-dearly
favored capital punishment.

Some of these groups favored the

death penalty by as much as a 70^-percent .ratio (see Gallup
Opinion Index, November, 1974) ,
Opponents of the validity of public opinion polls
generally base their criticisms on cases where the poll showed
one candidate winning a close election race while, in fact,
that candidate lost in a close decision.

This is a quibbling

over a few percentage points1 variance either way.

Few, how-

ever, could dispute the validity of these public opinion polls
taken on the issue of capital punishment.

Because of the

strong majority-^64 percent nationwide-r-it would be correct
to say that the American public has indicated in no uncertain
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terms that capital punishment is a valid method in combatting
crime in the United States,
Public opinion in favor of capital punishment has
not been limited to public opinion polls, however.

Since

Furman v. Georgia, state legislatures in approximately one
half of the states have re-enacted capital punishment statutes
(see Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Defendant-Respondent,
pp. 22-25)..

Furman had effectively voided the death sentences

of 631 persons on death row in 32 states (see M. Meltsner,
Cruel & Unusual Punishment, pp. 292-93 [1973]).
Finally, in the face of a California Supreme Court
decision holding the death penalty unconstitutional, People v.
Anderson, 403 P,2d 880, cert. den. 406 U.S. 958 (1972), the
people of California approved an amendment to the state constitution calling for reinstatement of the death penalty in November, 1972, by an overwhelming two-to-one majority (see "Death—
California Style," 3 San Fernando Valley Law Review, 145, 153).
The result of this amendment was a revised codification of
California's capital punishment statute.
The California vote indicated that approximately
67 percent of its citizens favored the death penalty.

It is

interesting to note that this figure is slightly higher than
the figure reached by the Gallup Poll mentioned previously
herein.

If anything, this vote is hard evidence supporting

the validity of the 63 percent figure reached by Gallup!s
pollsters.
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While the people of Utah have not had the opportunity
to vote on the issue of capital punishment, this Court has
upheld the constitutionality of the Utah statute now under
attack in this case.

In State v. Winkle, 528 P.2d 467 (1974),

the Court upheld the statute further, voting that the Furman
decision has created great confusion in legal circles throughout the nation.

This decision, in light of the public opinion

polls, supports the assertion that Utah's citizenry is strongly
in favor of capital punishment.
In most cases, public opinion would have little
bearing on a court's decision in any particular case.

Public

opinion cannot change the legal issues to be considered.

Here,

however, in view of the previously voted pronouncements by the
U. S. Supreme Court that public opinion is of utmost and foremost importance in the determination of a capital punishment
issue, public opinion must be considered by the Court.

Clearly,

as evidenced by national opinion polls and Utah's judicial
declaration of the constitutionality of its capital punishment
statute, Utah's people and its courts favor capital punishment.
On this basis, this Court must once again decide this issue in
favor of capital punishment.
II.

UTAH'S LEGISLATURE CAN REASONABLY DETERMINE THAT THE
PROTECTION OF SOCIETY UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS REQUIRES
DEATH AS A FORM OF PUNISHMENT FOR SERIOUS OFFENSES.
Americans live in constant fear for their lives and

their property in today's society.

A recent Gallup poll

indicated that 45 percent of Americans are afraid to walk in
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their neighborhood at night.

Further, 19 percent do not feel

safe and secure in their own homes at night.

It is significant

to note that 57 percent of the nonwhites polled were afraid to
walk in their neighborhood at night, an increase of 9 percent
since 1972. Overall, one out of every eight Americans is both
afraid to walk in his neighborhood at night and insecure behind
the doors of his/her home (see Gallup Poll Index, November, 1975).
In light of these figures, it is not surprising that
21 percent of the large city residents polled and 15 percent of
the nation as a whole viewed crime as the top problem facing
their communities today.

With the present economic situation,

it is significant that crime was felt to be a bigger problem
than inflation and recession.

As late as 1949, only 4 percent

of the American public felt that crime was the number one problem in America (see Gallup Poll Index, November, 1975) .
The prominence given crime in the public's list of
top local problems is by no means limited to the views of
residents of the largest cities.

Even in medium and small

cities, crime is seen as the number one community problem.
There seems to be little hope of these figures
improving.

One half of the people polled felt that there was

more crime in their area than there was twelve months before
that date.

Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics prove

that these people were correct in their feelings.
All crimes increased 9 percent and violent crimes
increased 5 percent from 1974 to 1975,

In the western states,

murder increased by 9 percent during that same period.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This

continues a trend that has been evident for several years as
shown by. the following table:

To
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974 "
1975

From

Total
Crime

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

+ 10%
+ 9
+ 6
- 4
+ 6
+ 18
+ 9

*

Violent
Crime
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

11%
12
11
2
5
11
5

-

Murder
+ 7
+ 8
+ 11
+ 5
+ 5
+ 6
- 1

In 1974, a murder occurred in the United States every 26
minutes and .a violent crime occurred every 33 seconds (see
FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, March 25, 1976).
The basis for the FBI statistics is their "total
crime index," which is a figure indicating the number of
crimes committed within a particular area.

In Utah, this

total crime index increased by 18.2 percent from 1973 to 1974,
and the violent crime index increased by 4.4 percent during
that time period.

Statistics are not yet available for 1974

to 1975 or 1975 to 1976 for Utah.
In an attempt to correct this bleak picture, Utah's
legislature has enacted the present capital punishment statute
now being challenged in this Court (see Utah Code Annotated,
§76-3-206, 207 [1973 Supp.]).

We contend that the death

penalty serves a vital purpose in the punishment structure of
society and that this is a matter upon which the legislature
of this state should make the determination.
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The showing as to the social utility of capital
punishment should be addressed to the legislative body; and
the burden, if any, which must be assumed in the judicial
setting, is only to demonstrate that there is, in fact, a
basis upon which the legislature of this state could reasonably conclude that certain serious offenses should be punished
by death.

It is a settled doctrine of constitutional law that

the burden of proof is on the one who challenges the constitutionality of a statute and that in the absence of a clear
showing of unconstitutionality a state statute will be presumed
valid (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 [1961]).
The basic elements commonly ascribed as the purposes of punishment may be reduced to four:

(1) deterrence,

(2) incapacitation or isolation, (3) rehabilitation, and
(4) retribution.
As to rehabilitation, it is obvious that as to the
serious criminal offender deemed not capable of rehabilitation and sentenced to death, this purpose of punishment is not
viable.

In recent years, at least as to the nonviolent offen-

der, rehabilitation was considered the progressive goal of
punishment.

However, recent studies have cast much doubt on

the effectiveness of rehabilitation in the penal system.
Indeed, lack of rehabilitation in the penal system was most
probably a basis for the enactment of the habitual offender
statutes (see Utah Code Annotated, §76-8-1001, 1002 [1973
Supp.]).
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As to retribution, while it may not now be recognized
as a major objective in our system of punishment, as Lord
Justice Denning said:
The punishment inflicted for grave crimes should
adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great
majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to
consider the objectives of punishment as being
deterrent or .reformative or preventive and nothing
else . . . The ultimate justification of any
punishment is . . . that it is the emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime; and . . .
there are some murders which . . . demand the
most emphatic denunication of all, namely the
death penalty.
(Quoted in National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws, 2 Working Papers 1359
[n. 47] [1970])
And as Justice Stewart said in his concurring opinion
in Furman v. Georgia, supra at 308:
On that score I would say only that 'I cannot
agree that retribution is a constitutionally
impermissible ingredient in the imposition of
punishment. The instinct for retribution is part
of the nature of man, and channeling"that instinct
in the administration of criminal justice serves
an important purpose in promoting the stability
of a society governed by law. When people begin
to believe that organized society is unwilling or
unable to impose upon criminal offenders the
punishment they "deserve," then there are sown
the seeds of anarchy <-~of self-help, vigilante
justice and lynch of law.
One commentator, in discussing the retributive
theory of punishment, said that those who ignore this facet
of punishment are only evidencing sentimental foolishness,
that if the natural desire for vengeance is not met and satisfied by the orderly procedure of the criminal law there is
danger of reversion to the bloody vengeance of feud and
vendetta.

He also noted that rather than calling this urge

of human nature to be a "passion for revenge" it could, with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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equal aptness, be termed the "passion for justice" (Morris R.
Cohen, "Moral Aspects of Criminal Law," 49 Yale Law Journal
987 at 1011-12).

m

t

One purpose of punishment is isolation or incapacitation.

Life imprisonment often provides a woefully inadequate

method of protecting society through incapacitation or isolation of the offender*

In Utah, the Board of Pardons has

absolute discretion regarding when to parole a prisoner (Utah
Code Annotated, §76-3-202 [1973 Supp.]).

In cases such as this

where the Defendant has been convicted of first-degree murder,
the prisoner must serve only 15 years of the life-imprisonment
sentence.

The myth that paroled or incarcerated murderers do

not kill again evaporates very readily upon perusal of case
reports throughout the nation.
It must be noted that the armed robber or armed
burglar commonly faced with a maximum term of life imprisonment if apprehended might well consider himself foolish not to
kill his victim or a witness if in doing so he would risk only
the same penalty—life imprisonment for murder—while increasing multifold his chances of avoiding apprehension.

The armed

robber of the one-man liquor store would not let the petitioners1
views of the dignity of human life cause him to hesitate for a
moment in killing the lonely figure behind the counter at a
late hour when there are no other persons around to witness
such an execution.

The same applies to the willingness of the

armed robber to kill a police officer to avoid apprehension and
conviction, when without the death penalty the criminal will
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risk no added punishment if he does away with his intended
captor.

This would also be true of the "lifer" in a correc-

tional facility who is faced with only another life sentence
for taking the life of a guard in prison.

Such a sentence

would not only be futile, but would make a mockery of our
system of justice.
Some studies have concluded that the death penalty
exerts no discernible influence on the rate of homicides.

It

is evident that these statistical studies were "fatally flawed"
in the failure to hold constant other factors besides punishment that might influence the murder rate (see generally Posner,
"The Economic Approach to Law," 53 Texas Law Review 757, 76668 [1975]).

In fact, at least one study has concluded that

when capital punishment was actually used a significant number
of lives were saved (Ehrlich, "The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment:

A Question of Life and Death," 75 American

Economic Review 397 [June, 1975]).
The existence of so many influential factors not
susceptible of measurement and correlation would impugn the
-statistical methodology of the studies concluding that capital
punishment has no deterrent effect.

Clearly, the existence

of these variables precludes a meaningful comparison between
general undifferentiated murder statistics and a single proposed causal factor—that of the existence of the death penalty
in a particular jurisdiction.
Secondly, the steady increase of homicides across
the nation, presumably caused by social and economic factors,
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naturally tends to cover up the perceptible deterrent effects
of the death penalty which might appear in the antiseptic conditions of the social laboratory.

t

A third objection to this statistical approach is
that it measures the homicide rate in terms of the theoretical
existence of the death penalty, that is, the existing statutes
and judgments imposing the punishment of death, rather than in
terms of the actual existence of the death penalty, that is,
the executions carried out.

During the previous decade in

which the dramatic increases in murders were recorded, while
juries continued at a relatively stable rate to fix the penalty
of death in the appropriate cases, the annual executions in
the United States dwindled to nothing.

The period from 1968

through 1973 showed that the number of offenses of murder
increased 42 percent and that the rate per hundred thousand
inhabitants was up 35 percent (FBI, Uniform Crime Reports,
1973 [September 6, 1974] at 6-7).
U. S. Justice Marshall observed in Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514 at 531 (1968), with general reference to the
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions,
. . . The long-standing and still raging debate
over the validity of the deterrence justification
for penal sanctions has not reached any sufficiently clear conclusions to permit it to be said
that such sanctions are ineffective in any particular context or for any particular group of people
who are able to appreciate the consequences of
their acts.
We submit that this foregoing statement has equal
validity when applied specifically to the deterrent effect of
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the death penalty.

It would appear to be a fact that to the

rational person the threat of the greater punishment has a
greater deterrent effect (see Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment Report, 1949-1953 at p. 24, Section 68 [1953]).
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized
the deterrent effect of capital punishment (see Brady v. U. S.,
397 U.S.. 742, 775 [1970]; U. S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581
[1968]).
We submit that the Utah State Legislature can also
conclude that the existence of the death penalty for certain
heinous crimes might cause some potential murderers to be so
gripped by fear that they would be deterred from criminal
endeavors and would refrain from the firing of a gun at the ,
lonely gas station attendant standing in a gas station or the
police officer attempting to effect an arrest.

As the "Joint

Report" of the Legislative Committee on Capital Punishment of
Pennsylvania said:

"The plain fact is that it can never be

known how many persons are actually deterred by threat of
punishment whether capital or otherwise."

It is also said that

if capital punishment is so unique, so abhorrent, and so fearsome it seems inconceivable that a rational person trying to
decide whether to commit a capital crime would ignore the
potential penalty of death.

The innocent life saved when the

potential murderer is "so gripped by fearfl of the death penalty
as to hold his fire and refrain from taking someone's life is
not reflected in the statistics surveyed by the social scientists.
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The fact that the death penalty does not deter all
is no reason for rejecting this form of punishment.

The

statistics, to which earlier reference has been made, lump the
undeterrable murderers with those that possibly could have
been deterred.

Studies of murder rates and their relation-

ship to the death .penalty would be valid only if they were
limited to deterrable homicides involving a course of conduct
understandingly embarked upon such as armed robbery, collection of insurance on the victim's life, kidnapping for ransom,
etc.
The position of the person who must deal face to
face with homicidal offenders—law enforcement officers^—
understandably takes a position in favor of the death penalty.
The late J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, stated his
unqualified objection to the abolition of capital punishment
as follows:
The professional law enforcement officer is
convinced from experience that the hardened criminal
has been and is deterred from killing based on the
prospect of the death penalty . . . . For the law
enforcement officer the time-proven deterrents to
crime are sure detection, swift apprehension, and
proper punishment. Each is a necessary ingredient.
(FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, 1959 issue)
In conclusion, it is submitted that there has been
no clear showing that the death penalty serves no legitimate
function in our society.

The U. S. Constitution and the Consti-

tution of the State of Utah give to the legislature, the elected
representatives of the people, the right to determine that the
protection of society under present conditions requires death as
a form of punishment for certain serious crimes.
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CONCLUSION
The will of the people has clearly been shown to
favor the existence of capital punitehment in Utah.

In an era

characterized by rising crime rates, mass killings, inmate
homicides, revolutionary bombings of public buildings, and the
assassination of public figures and law enforcement officers,
it would be inappropriate for a legislature to contravene the
will of society by abolishing capital punishment.

How much

less appropriate would it be for this Court to decree that
this form of punishment, sanctioned by the history of our
state and nation, is now forbidden to the people?

A society

designed to protect its innocent members from savage and
senseless acts demands that it be allowed to use all available
methods to afford this protection to its citizenry.
Capital punishment is a viable and effective tool
in the never-ending war against crime.

To abolish such a

tool would undoubtedly do substantial harm to the welfare of
Utah residents.

Prosecutors of Utah
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